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WATER Now: THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY FENCE ON
PALESTINIAN WATER RIGHTS AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST BANK
t
Andrew R. Malone

I. Introduction+
A. The Importance of Water
Water is one of the Middle East's scarcest resources, and arguably the
most valuable. It is crucial to both the life and livelihoods of people, yet in
the West Bank, there exists a severe shortage of water for many Palestinian
villagers. Israel's increased security measures during the al Aqsa Intifada
have heightened the water shortage. One Palestinian woman's testimonial
reveals the drastic plight of many who struggle to find water. Izdahar
Muhammad Sh'aban al-Jenazreh ("Izdahar") of the village of Hadab alFawwar, in the Hebron District of the West Bank, relates: "I have ten
children. My husband used to work in Israel, but now, due to the al-Aqsa
intifada, he is unemployed... The village is hooked up to a water network
that is thirty years old.., not a drop of water flows through the system."1
Izdahar's family was too poor to dig a cistern in which to catch rainwater
so her husband and children fetched water from springs a kilometer away.2
Since the Intifada, Izdahar herself has gone to the springs, four times a day,
totaling four hours of work that tire her out: "(g)oing there is very tiring and
leaves me less time to take care of my children and the house."3 Such
hardships are not unusual in the West Bank villages, for "(f)ew residents
buy water from the tankers, which is expensive. 'A Izdahar and her children
tA.B., Kenyon College (2001); J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law (2005). I would like to thank Dean Hiram E. Chodosh for his guidance and
assistance on this Note, and Professor Amos Guiora and Jonathan S. Becker for their
knowledgeable insights and comments. I would also like to thank the entire editorial staff
for their hard work in preparing this Note for publication. Finally, I would like to thank my
parents and siblings for their constant support.
± The empirical research and data in this Note is current as of the date of its writing, Mar.
15, 2004.
1 Interview by Musa Hashhash with Izdahar Muhammad Sh'aban al-Jenazreh, Hadab alFawwar, Hebron District (June 30, 2001), in Yehezkel Lein, B'TSELEM, NOT EVEN A DROP,
THE WATER CRISIS IN PALESTINIAN VILLAGES WITHOUT A WATER NETWORK, (2001).

[hereinafter Hashhash Interview].
2
1d.
3id.
4id.
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shower once a week and use an outdoor toilet; and "the problem of getting
water taught us how important it is to save every drop."5
In Israel and the West Bank, Water spills out into every aspect of life.
Approximately 679 million cubic meters of water from the West Bank are
allotted each year to the Israelis and Palestinians,6 and the proportions
7
allocated to the Israelis and the Palestinians are not equal. The Interim
Agreement signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority on September 28,
1995 allocated 28.9% of the yearly West Bank water resources to the
8
Palestinians, and 71.1% of the water resources to Israel. For instance, on
average, Israeli settlers in the West Bank consume four times the water per
day as do the Palestinians living in the West Bank.9 The average daily
consumption by Palestinians such as Izdahar of 18.5 gallons falls short of
the World Health Organization's minimum recommendation of 26.5 gallons
of sanitary water per day, and far below the average daily consumption of
1°
water for Israeli West Bank settler use: seventy-four gallons per person.
The disparity of water consumption between the Palestinians and Israelis is
even more striking when one considers statistics on daily water
consumption for everything but agricultural use. According to B'Tselem's
12
July 2001 report Not Even a Drop, these include household," urban, and
industrial uses. 13 The report indicates that the average Palestinian in the
West Bank consumes sixty liters of water per day, while the average per
5

1d..

6 THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER ON AFFECTED WEST BANK COMMUNITIES,

REPORT OF THE MISSION TO THE HUMANITARIAN AND EMERGENCY POLICY GROUP (HEPG) OF
THE LOCAL AID COORDINATION COMMITrEE (LACC), 52 (MAY 4, 2003) [hereinafter THE
IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER ON AFFECTED WEST BANK COMMUNITIES].

7 The West Bank's water is largely derived from groundwater (or aquifers). The three
primary aquifers in the West Bank - the Western, Eastern, and Northeastern aquifers 3
produce around 600-660 Mm per year, of which the Palestinians use 115-123 Mmrl', the
Israelis use the remainder. Bader Ali Ahmad Abu Zahra, Water Crisis in Palestine, 136
DESALINATION 93, 94 (2000).
8 THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER ON AFFECTED WEST BANK COMMUNITIES,

supra note 6 at 51.

9William A. Orme Jr., In West Bank, Water Is as Touchy as Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2000, at A6.
1°Id.

11Yehezkel Lein, B'TSELEM, NOT EVEN A DROP, THE WATER CRISIS IN PALESTINIAN
VILLAGES WITHOUT A WATER NETWORK, at 1 (2001) [hereinafter NOT EVEN A DROP]
("drinking, cooking, hygiene, house-cleaning, flushing of toilets, laundering clothes, dish
washing, watering gardens, and small plots of vegetables and fruit trees").
12 Id. at 2 ("watering green areas, filling public swimming pools, and supplying water to
hospitals, businesses, and hotels").
13Id.("of various kinds that consumes water, primarily in the chemicals, food and drink,
building, and textile industries").
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capita consumption of water in Israel proper and the West Bank settlements
is 350 liters per day. 14 This lack of water practically incapacitates poorer
Palestinian families, as it did to Izdahar's family. If such disparity of
consumption of water persists in the coming decades, and the Security
Fence remains, the water crisis will grow unmanageable. Indeed, the West
Bank water resources will not likely prove capable of sustaining the
predicted rise in the West Bank Palestinian population."
At the same time, the issue of borders looms large in the West Bank.
With the Israeli and Palestinian peace process stymied for so long by the
deadly stalemate of the al Aqsa Intifada,16 the recent entente agreed upon
by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and newly elected Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas 17 now inspires much discussion over
what the borders between Israel and a projected Palestinian state would be.
The de facto border of any Palestinian state may not follow the Green Line,
which has been the Armistice Line between Israel and the Palestinian West
Bank since 1949, rather, in reality the Security Fence that Israel is building
in the West Bank may double as the border. Since the Palestinian Authority
has not stemmed the effectiveness of Palestinian militant factions, the
Israeli Government is threatening to take unilateral actions if the United
States-backed "road map" completely fails.' 8 These political and military
actions would include moving some West Bank settlements, withdrawing
the military ("IDF") from some towns in the West Bank, and drawing a
clear border between Israel and the West Bank.' 9 The border is likely to
14

1d.

15 The estimated 2004 mid-year population in the West Bank is 2,421,491, and the
projection for 2015 is 3,558,743. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Demographic
Indicators of the West Bank, 1997-2015, at http://www.pcbs.org/english/pupulati/
estimates/estn3.htm (last visited on Mar. 12, 2004). The corresponding statistics for all of
the Palestinian Territories (Gaza included), are 3,827,914, and 5,813,799. Id. Israel's
population in 2003 was 6,600,000. Jewish Virtual Library, Israeli Population Statistics, at
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/demographics.htnl.
16 See discussion infra Part II.B. Israel's Security Fence: Justifications and Contours.
17The ceasefire declared on Feb. 8, 2005, at Sharm el Sheik in Egypt.
18 Reuters, Arafat: Sharon Is Not Serious About Peace, Jan. 6, 2004; On Jan. 5, 2004,
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made a speech to the Likud Party's Central Committee,
in which he said that if the Palestinian Authority effectively ends terrorism, then the State of
Israel would cooperate in helping form a Palestinian state. However, Sharon warned that if
the Palestinian violence is not curtailed, Israel will physically separate itself from the
Palestinians, until violence ceases. Sharon's threat is known as his "disengagement plan." It
is widely speculated that the security separation line will follow the West Bank Security
Fence. Greg Myre, SharonJeeredas He Talks of Giving Up Settlements, N.Y. TiMES Jan. 6,
2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/06/intemational/middleeast/06MIDE.html.
19 See Israeli Troops Kill Three Palestiniansin West Bank, THE AsSOcIATED PRESS, Jan.
7, 2004.
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seal off the
become the electrified Security Fence, which is designed to
20
West Bank from Israel, thereby keeping out Islamic militants.
If the Israeli Government makes the Security Fence the de facto
border, it will exacerbate the already thorny issue of water rights in the
West Bank. For within the 13.5% of the Palestinian West Bank that Israel
has appropriated to erect the Fence, lies some of the most fertile West Bank
agricultural land, as well as at least thirty valuable agricultural and
21
communal wells which irrigate that land. Further, there is a lack of clean
and healthy water that is reaching West Bank villages that are adversely
affected by the Fence. Given the enmity that the Security Fence's impact
z
on water and land is fostering in Palestinian West Bank communities, the
Israeli Government should attempt to resolve the water issue now, for the
sake of its future security.23
If Israel does not strike a deal with the Palestinian Authority for the
West Bank communities to share in the distribution of water, the lack of
water allocated to these West Bank communities will likely motivate
further insurrection against Israelis. If and when the Palestinians do
achieve statehood, after negotiations the aquifers on the West Bank side of
20

See Myre, supra note 18.

21

See UN Map: Enclaves and Closed Areas between the Wall and the Green Line,

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HuMANITARIAN AFFAIRS OCCUPIED

PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, available at http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/maps/
thematic/WallProj_eng 250204.pdf; see also Appendix B, Water Sources in the West Bank,
(Oct. 10, 2002), UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANiTARIAN
available at http://www.mop.gov.ps/
AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY,
2
2
n/docs_archive/pna%5CThe%20impact%20of/o20isreal%60s%20separation% Obarrier/o O
on%20affected%20west%20bank%2Ocommunication.pdf.
22 Such anger is shown by recent (Dec. 27, 2003) protests by several thousand Palestinians
and foreign activists in the West Bank town of Qalqilya, against the construction of the
Fence. See Reuters, Arafat: Sharon Is Not Serious About Peace, Jan. 6, 2004 (Palestinians
think the Fence is a land grab); James Bennet, Overnight, a Towering Divide Rises in
Jerusalem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004 (citing the unpopularity of the Jerusalem portion of the
Fence with Palestinian East Jerusalem residents); United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Preliminary analysis by OCHA
reveals that the planned new Wall will have severe humanitarianconsequences for more
than 680,000 Palestinians in the West Bank -well beyond the impact of the current Wall,
Dec. 15, 2003 (noting that the land affected by the Fence is some of the most fertile in all of
the West Bank).
23 Incidentally, the world has taken an interest in the Fence, and the United Nations asked
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to issue an advisory opinion on the legality of the
Fence, which it did. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9) (recommending by a vote of fourteen to one
that Israel should tear down the Fence because its construction violates international law).
Israel's position is that the ICJ did not take a fair and balanced approach to the issue, and
now Israel emphasizes that since it is only an advisory opinion, the ICJ ruling has no binding
effect.
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the Fence that supply water to the Israeli side will likely belong to that new
State, and Israel will no longer have access to the crucial West Bank water
source. For their part, the West Bank Palestinians will only have complete
autonomy over the West Bank water if Israel recognizes a Palestinian state
in the West Bank. An effective peace plan, therefore, will help to resolve
the West Bank water issue.
B. Water And Agriculture On The West Bank
The Mountain aquifers in the Northwestern West Bank constitute the
largest water source in the West Bank and all of Israel.24 The erection of
Israel's Security Fence, which juts into the West Bank to protect key Israeli
settlements and to prevent infiltration of suicide bombers into Israel, should
not technically change the allocation of water from the three aquifers under
the 1995 Interim Agreement. It is likely, though, that due to the general
lack of water in the Middle East, the control of the Mountain aquifer water
will prove a sticking point in future peace negotiations.
Construction of the Security Fence, which impinges upon Palestinian
West Bank territory, will also appropriate for Israel many of the most
productive agricultural artesian wells in the West Bank, which were
previously used to irrigate Palestinian crops.26 The erection of the Security
Fence on Palestinian West Bank territory and the concomitant blow to
Palestinian control of West Bank water will undoubtedly ruin Palestinian
farming in the region.
C. Roadmap For This Note
In light of the new Israeli Security Fence as a possible permanent
border, and its effect on agriculture and water rights, this Note argues that
Israel should seek an alternate security solution. Section II will describe the
West Bank aquifers, the Security Fence, and the applicable international
law. Section III will evaluate the negative impact that the Security Fence
will have on the equitable control of the West Bank aquifers and
agricultural wells. The Security Fence will not only seriously impair the
hope of equitable distribution of water rights in the West Bank in the near
future, but it will also deliver an irreversibly crippling blow to Palestinian
agriculture in the West Bank. An unbalanced water regime in the West
Bank will have a significant effect on sustainable peace. Section IV will
See Appendix A, Water Map of Israel and the Territories,available at http://www.usisrael.org/jsource/History/watermapl .html.
24

25

THE

IMPACT

OF

ISRAEL'S

CoMMUNITIES, supra note 6, at 56.
26

Seeid. at 14.
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advance and evaluate several proposals for averting the water crisis
exacerbated by the Fence.
II. War and Water
In modem times, the West Bank, the heart of the proposed Palestinian
27
Israel
state, has been the focus of bitter water allocation disputes.
emerged from the 1967 Six Day War in the position of the upstream
riparian owner 28 of the Jordan River Basin, and also gained control over the
groundwater basins in the West Bank.29 Thus, from 1967 until the present
day, Israel has maintained control of the West Bank and all of its
groundwater. Indeed, control of groundwater is essentially control of
Palestinian water, since groundwater is the primary source of Palestinian
water.3 °
A. The West Bank Aquifers
The West Bank's Mountain aquifer, which Israel has controlled since
31
The
1967, provides one-third of the water that Israel consumes.
bounteous Mountain aquifer in the Northern highlands of the West Bank is
part of the Jordan River Basin system.32 Three primary aquifers comprise
the West Bank Mountain aquifer system: the Western, Northeastern, and
Eastern aquifers.33 The Western aquifer, located within both the West Bank
Even since ancient times, water has been highly prized in the Middle East. Passages
about water figure prominently in both the Old Testament and the Koran. In fact, the word
water (mayim) is used directly 580 times in the Hebrew Bible, and indirectly used even more
often, in references to rivers and wells. See DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN, THE STRUGGLE
FOR WATER AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 26 (1994). The considerably
shorter Koran uses the word water (ma') sixty times, fifty of which reference rivers. Id, at
26.
28 A riparian owner or proprietor is a landowner whose property borders a stream or river.
Riparian rights are rights of landowners whose property borders on a body of water or
watercourse. Landowners have the right to reasonably use the water. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1328 (7th ed. 1999).
29 Miriam Lowi & Jay Rothman, Arabs and Israelis: The JordanRiver, in CULTURE AND
NEGOTIATION THE RESOLUTION OF WATER DISPUTES 162 (Guy Olivier Faure & Jeffrey Z.
Rubin, eds., 1993). Israel then drew from the West Bank around one-quarter of its water.
Id.
30
Abu Zahra, supra note 7 at 94.
27

Franklin C. Spinney, The Struggle for Israel's Soul, The Hindu, Online edition of
India's National Newspaper, (Aug. 20, 2001) available athttp://www.hinduonnet.com/
thehindu/2001/08/20/stories/05202523.htm.
32
See Appendix A, Water Map of Israel and the Territories,supra note 24.
31

33 Abu Zahra, supra note 7, at 94.
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and Israel,34 draws on water from the West Bank Mountains, while the
Northeastern aquifer is located solely in the West Bank, near Nablus and
Jenin. 5 The Eastern aquifer, contained within the West Bank, accounts for
90% of the springs in the area, but is still largely unexplored.36
Aquifers are comprised of water passing below ground, and are
distinctly separate from surface water. 37 The groundwater is stored in either
an unconfined aquifer, which is commonly referred to as a watertable, or in
confined aquifers, known as artesian aquifers or wells.38 The first phase of
the Israeli Security Fence will appropriate or effectively isolate at least
thirty of these agricultural artesian wells 39 from Palestinian West Bank
farmers.
B. Israel's Security Fence: Justifications And Contours
Due to security concerns arising from the advent of the suicide bomber
in the al Aqsa Intifada, 40 Israel began building a "Security Fence" around
the West Bank in June 2002 .
One can immediately tell from the
controversy surrounding the name of this new fence, that its construction is
politically charged. The Israeli Government insists on calling its new
structure the "Security Fence," while Palestinians and the international
media refer to it as a "Wall" or "Separation Barrier." Through careful
semantic planning, the Israeli Government hopes to stop people from
equating the Fence with a permanently divisive edifice such as the Berlin
Wall. Indeed, the Israeli Government claims that the Fence is only a
temporary structure meant to protect Israel from suicide attacks on innocent
34 See Appendix A, Water Map of Israeland the Territories,supra
note 24..
35
36

Abu Zahra, supra note 7, at 94.
Id. at 95.

37 WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 19 (1988). The groundwater is commonly referred
to as 'percolating water,' meaning it comes from precipitation into the soil, water from
streams or irrigation, or artificial recharge methods. Id.
38

Id.

39 The water from artesian wells, which is able to rise to the surface through
internal

hydrostatic pressure, is most efficiently reached by drilling through thick rock or strata.
40 The most salient feature of the current, or al Aqsa Intifada, is the Palestinian suicide
bomber. See discussion infra Part II.B. However, the Palestinians charge that Israel's real
purpose for erecting the Fence is not to defend against suicide bombers; rather it is a mere
pretext for a "land grab" in the West Bank. See 2 PalestiniansKilled During Protests of
West Bank Barrier,ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 2004, [hereinafter 2 PalestiniansKilled] at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Israel-Palestinians.html.
41YEHEZKEL LEIN, B'TSELEM, BEHIND THE BARRIER, HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS A
RESULT OF ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER, A POSITION PAPER, (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter
BEHIND THE BARRIER] (on file with author).
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civilians.42 Yet, to the 600,000 to 700,000 Palestinians affected by it,
Israeli "doves," and to spectators across the globe, the Fence seems
decidedly permanent, as well as inimical to the achievement of a lasting
peace.4 3
Some may ask why the situation in Israel and the West Bank has come
to this, and why Israel feels the need to erect a seemingly permanent barrier
in the West Bank, thereby further alienating the resident Palestinians and
ostensibly jeopardizing any hope of achieving even a tenuous peace that
would enable Israel to exist outside the menacing shadow of the suicide
bomber. The grim statistics of the al Aqsa Intifada explain the need for the
Security Fence. Since September 29, 2000, when Ariel Sharon visited the
al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and the Palestinians subsequently began the
violent resistance known as the al Aqsa Intifada, there have been a total of
22,406 attacks against Israel in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel
itself.44 A total of 972 Israelis have died since September 2000, 445 of
those from suicide bombs. 45 The suicide bomber has altered the political
dynamics of the region. Faced with repeated horrific bombings in public
buses, cafes, malls, and at checkpoints, the Israelis decided to attempt to
preempt the efforts of the Palestinian militant groups who equip, train, and
inspire the suicide bombers.46
The stated aim of the Security Fence is to stop suicide bombers from
infiltrating from the Palestinian West Bank into the Jewish settlements,
Jerusalem, and Israel proper, though Palestinians see the Fence as an
outright land grab. The Israeli Defense Force ("IDF") will monitor every
gate of the fence, so they can control who enters Israel. The Fence is a
42 See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied

Palestinian Territory, New Wall Projections (Nov. 8, 2003) [hereinafter New Wall
Projections].
43 See Pope Condemns 'Terrorism,' Criticizes Israel Fence, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 2003
(explaining the criticism of the Fence by Pope John Paul II: "The construction of a wall
between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people is seen by many as a new obstacle on
the road to peaceful cohabitation. . . . In fact, the Holy Land does not need walls but
bridges."); see also Clashes in West Bank, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2003, Late Edition, at 10(1)
(recounting demonstrations against the Fence in the town of Qalqilya by both Palestinians
and foreigners).
44 ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE, West Bank, Gaza Strip andHome Total ofAttacks in the Front
Since Sept. 2000, at http://wwwl.idf.il/SIPSTORAGE/DOVER/files/9/21829.doc (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
45 ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE, CasualtiesSince 29.09.2000, and Details of Security Forces

at http://wwwl.idf.il/SIPSTORAGE/DOVER/
and Israeli Civilians Killed,
files/8/4/33524.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
46 These militant groups include Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade and
Hizzbullah. This Note will not specifically discuss whether these militant groups are
wielders of terror, freedom fighters, or some perverse mixture of both. It is enough to note
here that this debate only intensifies the different viewpoints of the parties.
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highly effective, albeit restrictive, way of eliminating attacks by Palestinian
militants coming from the West Bank. Although the number of suicide
attacks on Israel has declined by around 90% since the erection of the
Fence,47 it remains unproven whether the Fence can completely stop
Palestinian militant attacks on Israel.
The Security Fence, according to the Israeli Government (Ministry of
Defence - Seam Zone Authority) Maps 48 published on October 23, 2003,
will span more than four hundred miles, or 638 km (including Jerusalem)
through the West Bank.49 As of March 2004, more than 120 miles of the
Fence were completed 50 in the Northwest West Bank and near Jerusalem.
Each mile of the Fence costs around $4 million, and the total cost of the
Fence is estimated at more than $1.3 billion.51 Formed out of trenches,
concrete walls, sundry obstacles, and an electronic fence that will warn the
IDF every time someone attempts to cross it, 52 the Fence is the most
impenetrable security barrier ever constructed in Israel. To the west of the
Fence lie three roads: "a trace road, intended to reveal the footprints of a
person who crossed the fence, a patrol road, and an armored vehicles
road. '' 53 Immediately to the east is a service road protected by barbed wire,
then further east is a trench intended to stop attempts at 'running' through
the Fence.54 On average, the Fence will be 60 meters wide, but that width
will fluctuate up to 100 meters.
In certain areas, especially where the
Fence adheres to the Green Line, there are "depth barriers," which are not
fences per se, but rather deep trenches with barbed wire, designed to restrict

47 Jewish Virtual Library, Israel's Security Fence, at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/

jsource/ Peace/fence.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
48 See UN Map, Enclaves and Closed Areas between the Wall and the Green Line, supra
note 21.
49 Greg Myre, U.N. Estimates Israeli Barrier Will Disrupt Lives of 600,000, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2003 at A6; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Occupied Palestinian Territory, New Wall Projections(Nov. 8, 2003) (updated in Jan. 2004).
50 Michael Woods, Controversial Israeli security fence is 'engineering tour de force,
POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 2004, at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04061/
279284.stm.
51Id. See also Mark Lavie, Israel may review West Bank barrierplans, THE CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.cleveland.com/search/index.ssf?/base/
news/1074513355241030.xml?nnfor.
52 BEHIND THE BARRIER, supra note 41, at 6.
PITrSBURGH

" HCJ 7784/02, Sa'al 'Awani 'Abd al Hadi et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the
West Bank, sec. 23 (the State of Israel's response), in BEHIND THE BARRIER, supra note 41,
at 6.
54 BEHIND THE BARRIER, supra note 41, at 6.
55

Id.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 36:639

access.56 The Fence provides access to points beyond, via gates, including
some twenty-six "agricultural gates. ' 7
According to a recent New York Times article, the barrier will
completely surround twelve Palestinian communities, granting the residents
of those communities access to the outside world only through gates
manned by the IDF. 58 According to a recent report by the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 59 the Fence will
follow the border of the 1949 Green Line, the ostensible border of Israel
and the West Bank, for only 11 percent of the Green Line's entire 315 km
span.60 The Fence, in fact,6 1in some areas encroaches six to seven
kilometers into the West Bank.
A recent UN report estimates that Israel's Security Fence will
effectively appropriate 13.5% or 191,000 acres of the West Bank, much of
it fertile land, on which some 189,000 Palestinians live.62 Breaking down
further the affected population and land, the UN estimates that of the
191,000 acres between the Fence and the original Green Line, 152,000 of
those acres lie within a "closed" area, 39,000 acres within an "enclave"
area, and ultimately 21,000 acres within a "depth barrier., 63 A total of
20,000 Palestinians from fifty-nine communities will fall within the
"closed" areas between the Security Fence and the Green Line, 169,000
Palestinians from forty-one communities will fall within the enclaves,
meaning the Fence will completely surround them; while the Fence will
101,000 Palestinians from nineteen communities in
also ultimately place
4
"depth barriers."
These numbers do not include the Israeli settler population.
Additionally, the report estimates that the Fence would effectively disrupt
the lives of somewhere around 400,000 Palestinians living east of the
Fence, who would need to pass through the Fence to reach their farmlands,
jobs, and basic services. 65 Thus, based on the UN report of December 15,
16
57

Id.at7.
id.

58 Myre, supra note 49.
59The Israeli Government derides this report as inaccurate.
60Haaretz Service and Agencies, UN: Only 11 percent of separationfence follows Green

Line, (November 11, 2003), at http//www.haaretz.con/hasen/spages/359272.html
visited Nov. 12, 2003); New Wall Projections,supra note 42.
61 BEHIND THE BARRIER, supra note 41, at 8.
62

(last

New Wall Projections,supra note 42; The head of the UN agency in Jerusalem, David

Shearer, claims the report was not intentionally political. Myre, supranote 49.
63 See UN Map, Enclaves and Closed Areas between the Wall and the Green Line, supra
note 21.
64Id
65
New Wall Projections,supra note 42.
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2003, the Security Fence will affect a total of around 674,000 people, or
30% of the Palestinians in the West Bank.6 6
C.

The Legal Framework Of The Dispute

The international law that governs Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories is both conflicting and insufficient. Statehood theories and
common law cross-border international water allocation theories can apply,
but in the end, the law of Occupied Territories is more appropriate for the
issue of borders and water in the West Bank.
1. The Law of Occupied Territories
Since the West Bank is currently an Occupied Territory 67 with Israel as
the occupying power and the Palestinians the occupied people, the law of
Occupied Territories is especially relevant to the Security Fence's impact
on Palestinian water and agricultural rights. The binding authority for the
law of Occupying Powers is predicated on the 1907 Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War ("Hague Convention").68 The
Hague Convention provides legal guidelines for an occupying power to
follow.
Over time, the Hague Convention has become customary
international law that the international community, including Israel,
believes applicable to the West Bank even though Palestine is not currently
a recognized State.69
Israel is arguably violating key provisions of the Hague Convention
and is thus violating international law. Article 46 of the Hague Convention
provides that an occupying power is obligated to refrain from confiscating
private property.7 ° In its construction of the Security Fence, Israel is
66 Id; See also Myre, supra note 49; Haaretz, supra note 60; BBC NEWS, Israel barrier
'brings hardship,' Israel's West Bank security barrier will cause serious human suffering,
the UN has said in a report, Nov. 11, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/3260855.stm.)
67 See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Section III
Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State, at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm ("Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army").
68 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; See The Avalon Project -Laws of War: Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Hague IV), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm,
(last visited on Mar. 8, 2004).
69 See Harold Dichter, The Legal Status of Israel's Water Policies in the Occupied
Territories,35 HARV. INT'L L. J. 565,574 (Spring, 1994).

Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 46, 36 Stat. at 2306-07, in Id, at 575.
70
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it is confiscating West Bank land that is
violating this provision because
71
private Palestinian property.
Similarly, Israel may be in violation of Article 55 of the Hague
Convention. Article 55 of the Hague Convention provides that the
occupying power is the "administrator and usufructuary of ...real estate,
forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated
in the occupied country. '' 72 Thus, the occupying power can reap the
benefits from lands owned by the State, but not from privately-owned land.
Most of the land confiscated in order to build the Fence is private
Palestinian farmland, and some is land that contains essential, privatelyowned 73 agricultural wells. Thus, Israel's confiscation of West Bank
agricultural land and agricultural wells violates the Hague Convention.
This confiscation of land and water will have a devastating effect on the
Palestinian West Bank agricultural economy.
2. Statehood
Whether or not Palestine becomes a State also affects the legality of
the Fence and the allocation of water. The Palestinians of the West Bank
will have the right to use the water of the West Bank without restrictions
only if they achieve the creation of a Palestinian State recognized by Israel.
An independent Palestinian State in the West Bank would benefit the
Palestinian people in a practical way. As a sovereign State, its bargaining
power for West Bank water and farming issues could rise to a level closer
to that of Israel. Palestinians today feel that if a Palestinian State controlled
the West Bank aquifers, then it could allocate more water to its villages
than the Israelis are now doing.74
The differences between how the Israelis and Palestinians want to
control and allocate the West Bank water is striking. The Palestinians
claim through full sovereignty almost all of the surface and groundwater of

71 The Israeli Government has set aside $22 million as compensation for those

Palestinians unable to use their land because of the Security Fence. Jewish Virtual Library,
Fact Sheets #24: Israel'sSecurity Fence (UpdatedJuly 14, 2004), at 3.
72 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 55, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; See The Avalon Project -Laws of War: Laws and
Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/
hague04.htm, (last visited on Mar. 8, 2004).
73Most of these wells are privately owned, and some are communal. None are part of the
Palestinian Water Authority network. THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER ON
AFFECTED WEST BANK CoMMuNrIs, supra note 6, at 52.
74 See Deborah Horan, Palestinians and Israelis Lock Horns Over Water, INTERPRESS
SERVICE (Mar. 20, 1998).
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the West Bank. 75 Their claim is predicated upon the Johnston Plan of 1955,
when Jordan was the sovereign ruler of the Palestinians.76 The United
States-sponsored Johnston plan provided in part, for the distribution of the
River Jordan's water to the riparian States, including Israel and Jordan. At
the time, the riparian Sates did not fully embrace the plan, although in the
peace negotiations of the 1990's, the plan experienced a revival of sorts. 7
The Israelis claim the West Bank water based on historical rights.78
Israel's dependence on the West Bank aquifers has now evolved to the
point where the aquifers supply Israeli coastal cities including Tel Aviv, 79
as well as Jerusalem.8 ° Israeli water experts believe that if a peace
settlement hands the Palestinians control of the West Bank aquifers, the
water is likely to become polluted, a situation which would in turn
eventually pollute the various rivers coursing into Israel proper.8'
3. Cross-Border Theories
Cross-border theories of international water law are also instructive on
the question of West Bank water rights.
a. Three Theories Of International Water Law
Two theories of water rights between adjoining States have given way
to a third, more equitable and conciliatory theory of sovereignty over water.
Upstream States with a drainage basin system prefer the theory of absolute
territorial sovereignty, known as the Harmon Doctrine. Under this doctrine,
the upstream State can use the rivers or waters within its territory, without
heeding the water rights of any downstream riparian States.82 If Palestine
were a State, it would likely claim the right to the West Bank aquifers,
which flow from the lower Jordan River, on the basis of this theory.
75 ARNON SOFFER, RIVERS OF FIRE, THE CONFLICT OVER WATER
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 191

(Murray Rosovsky & Nina Copaken trans., 1999). Including the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians
claim between 500 and 560 million m3 of water, as well as 150-200 million m3 of the Jordan
River. Id.
76 SOFFER, at 191.
77 SOFFER, at 158-60.
78

SOFFER, supra note 75, at 191.

79

A city of around 2 million people, including the suburbs. Id.

80

d

81Id.

Raed Mounir Fathallah, Water disputes in the Middle East: An International Law
Analysis of the Israel-JordanPeace Accord, 12 J. LAND USE & ENvTL L. 119, 134-35 (Fall,
1996).
82
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Absolute territorial sovereignty, however, is disfavored in international law,
since in neglecting the rights of downstream riparian States it does not
peacefully or equitably resolve riparian conflicts.
Downstream riparian States prefer the theory of absolute integrity of
the watercourse, 4 whereby upper riparian States cannot harm or affect the
85
Yet
quality of waters they share with downstream riparian States.
absolute integrity of the watercourse inequitably allocates rights to the
international waterway, presumably because it does not specify the rights of
86
control, and it too is disfavored in international law.
The third and more equitable theory of international water rights is the
doctrine of restricted sovereignty, under which States explicitly recognize
87
the shared water.
that each riparian State has a right to access and use
Restricted sovereignty is now the dominant theory for disputes between
88
international law.
riparian States. It reflects the current state of customary
The theory of restricted sovereignty led to the established rule of the
equitable utilization or allocation of shared water, which is integral to the
present-day Israeli-Palestinian water conflict, given the89 fact that Israel
claims the West Bank Aquifers as a primary water source.
b. International Agreements
Codified international law is sparse in the area of international
watercourses; however, existing water rights agreements give a framework
for the present debate. The earliest evidence of a customary law of
international watercourses is the International Law Association's ("ILA")
well-respected 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
83 See id. at 135, citing Jonathan E. Cohen, InternationalLaw and the Water Politics of
the Euphrates,24 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 522-23 (1991).

84 A watercourse is a "body of water flowing in a reasonably definite channel with bed
and banks." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (7th ed. 1999).

85 Fathallah, supra note 82, at 135, citing Jonathan E. Cohen, InternationalLaw and the
Water Politics of the Euphrates,24 N.Y.U.J INT'L L. & POL. 503, 523 (1991).
86 Id.

87 Id. citing Joseph W. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instrumentsfor ManagingInternationally-

Shared Water Resources: RestrictedSovereignty v. Community of Property26 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 27, 36 (1994).

88 The International Court of Justice ("IC") applied restricted sovereignty in the case of
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25); See also
PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I 348 (1995)
(discussing the Lake Lanoux Arbitration with France and Spain as parties).
89 Fathallah, supra note 82, at 135; see also B'TSELEM, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION, THE
WATER CRISIS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ITS RESOLUTION IN THE FINAL-STATUS

AGREEMENT, 52, (Jerusalem, July 2000) [hereinafter B'TSELEM, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION].
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International Rivers ("Helsinki Rules"). 90 Article IV of the Helsinki Rules
contains the first recitation of the doctrine of the equitable use of
international water: "each basin State is entitled within its territory, to a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
international drainage basin." 9 1 However, since the ILA has no binding
authority, the Helsinki Rules have not proved particularly helpful in
international disputes, and they are not considered customary international
law.92
More recently, in 1997 the United Nations General Assembly
approved the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses ("UN Convention").9 3 The UN passed the
Convention; however, it is not yet in effect because not enough States have
ratified it, including Israel, who abstained in the General Assembly vote. 94
Israel, however, still must honor the Convention because the primary
principles are generally regarded as customary international law,95 and
therefore apply even to States that have not yet ratified the Convention. 96
Article 6 of the 1997 UN Convention implements the doctrine of
restricted sovereignty in its list of factors to consider when determining the
relative rights of States that share an international watercourse. 97 The
Israelis and Palestinians each emphasize a different factor from the
90 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASOCIATION, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF

INTERNATIONAL RIVERS,
91Id.at art. IV.

5 2 ndConf. (Aug.

20, 1967).

92 See Nico SCHRIUVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, BALANCING RIGHTS

AND DUTIES, 130, (1997).
93United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International
Watercourses, UN General Assembly Resolution 51/229, 21 May 1997, in B'TSELEM,
THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION, supra note 89, at 51.
94B'TSELEM, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION, supra note 89, at 51.
95Customary international law typically exists in the form of international conventions,
international custom or general practices accepted by law, general principles of law that are
recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions, or respected academic opinions. Statute
of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1179.
96 d. For support for the idea that the Convention is now regarded as customary
international law see International Court of Justice, 1997, pars. 85, 147 (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihsjijudgement 970925_frame.htm).
97The factors are: 1. The natural features of the shared watercourse; 2. the
social and
economic needs of the watercourse states; 3. the population dependent on the watercourse in
each watercourse state; 4. the effects of the use of the watercourses in one watercourse state
on other watercourse states; 5. existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 6.
conservation, protection, and development of the water resources of the watercourse and the
costs of measures taken to that effect; 7. the availability of alternatives to a particular
planned or existing use. See B'TSELEM, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION, supra note 89, at 52.
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Convention to argue that equitable use of the West Bank water should favor
their solution. As evidence of the fact that the Convention is customary
law, Israel has applied the Convention. It interprets factor 5 of the
Convention, which cites "existing and potential uses of the watercourse," as
meaning that the Mountain aquifer of the West Bank must be divided
according to past historical uses. 98 The Palestinians counter that these past
uses were conducted with force under a period of occupation; therefore,
99
they should not prevail over the potential uses of the Mountain aquifer.
The Palestinians, for their part, cite the first factor, "the natural
features of the shared watercourse," in an attempt to rely on the theory of
in
water 00
absolute territorial sovereignty, which proposes that the amount ofrights.'
apportionment
the
determines
States
the
of
each
from
aquifer
the
If this theory were indeed applied, then the Palestinians would claim around
90% of the Mountain aquifer. 1 1 However, absolute territorial sovereignty
has never been applied in international law, and the Convention supports
the equity, or restricted sovereignty principle. Hence, the Palestinian
argument would likely falter. The conflicting Israeli and Palestinian
interpretations of the Treaty demonstrate that the applicable customary
international law does not solve the West Bank water problem.
c. West Bank Aquifers as International Waterways
An often overlooked yet essential element of the water issue in the
West Bank is that two of the three aquifers, the Western and Northeastern,
are international waterways, since they are located in both Israel and the
West Bank. 0 2 The Eastern aquifer, on the other hand, is considered
10 3
If the
endogenous, or completely within the borders of the West Bank.
West Bank becomes part of a sovereign Palestinian state, then under the
first principle of the law of international rivers, the Palestinian state would
have the right to use its water. 104 This right to use the water of the three

98

Id. at 53.

99 Id. at 53; id. at n. 193.

1°°Id. at 53.

Id.
1o1
102 If one considers the West Bank an independent entity from Israel. See
Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations Affairs Department, Permanent
Status Issues: Water. http://www.nad-plo.org/permanent/water.html.
103

Id.; see also Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations Affairs Department,

Lexicon of International Legal and Technical Terms and Phrases Relevant to Water, (5

Nov. 1999).
104 SOFFER, supranote 75, at 9, 11.
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West Bank aquifers would not preclude the Palestinians from sharing the
water with their downstream riparian neighbors the Israelis. 105
The current system of water apportionment in the West Bank violates
the third and fourth principles of the Helsinki Principles law of international
rivers, which provide that all of the basin States may share equally in using
and exploiting the available water for various purposes,10 6 and that
sovereign107....States may only use the river basin's water in a just and equitable
manner.
Hence, Israel is not equitably allocating water in the West Bank.
III. Fencing Water
There exists no commanding principle to resolve international water
disputes under the law of Occupation or generally between nations. This
state of uncertainty is particularly troubling in the Middle East. Now that
Israel has chosen to combat terrorism by erecting the Fence, the solution to
the allocation of the West Bank water has grown in importance and
complexity. If the Security Fence eventually becomes the de facto border
between Israel and the West Bank, then the sharing of water under and
across that border will be one necessary issue to resolve. Even if the Fence
is not the ultimate border, for the time being it is a major disruption of the
Palestinian West Bank water and agricultural system. The Fence enrages
West Bank Palestinians, who have had to cede some of their most fertile
farmland and wells to the IDF and the Security Fence. This land and water
dispute is a civil rights and humanitarian problem which the parties
themselves must address.
The Fence's effect on water is counterproductive to the Israeli
Government's goal of security. Even if only temporary, the Fence's
appropriation of West Bank property and of well water from the West
Bank's Western aquifer is inciting the West Bank Palestinians to protest
and violence. At first, these protests over the Fence were nonviolent and
included Israeli demonstrators, which is a rarity for the Israeli-Palestinian
°8 It
conflict.1
appears
the Jerusalem
region, the protests
havenow,
turnedhowever,
violent, that
with especially
Palestinian inyouths
throwing
105Id

at 12, citing the second section of the 1966 Helsinki Accords on Water Issues.

106 SOFFER, supra note

75, at 10.

107 id.
108 See Greg Myre, Israel Adjusting Route of West Bank Barrier, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004 (describing a joint Israeli-Palestinian protest at the 25-foot-high concrete
wall at the portion of the Fence which separates Abu Dis from Jerusalem), available at
http:www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/inteaational/middleeast/08CNDMIDE.html.;
James
Bennet, On the West Bank, a Hint of Resistance Without Blood, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 29, 2004
(reporting a "bloodless protest movement" against the Fence, and comparing the movement
to the civil disobedience of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/O2/29/weekinreview/29benn.html..
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stones at the Fence's construction workers, Palestinian farmers scuffling
with IDF soldiers, and IDF soldiers shooting and sometimes killing the
protesters. 10 9 With their travel and their access to farmland greatly
restricted by the Fence, and with less water for their crops and for daily use,
Palestinian anger towards Israeli occupation policies has increased.
A. The Security Fence And Its Impact On West Bank Water
Resources
Israel's new Security Fence takes a marked step backward for the
equitable use of the region's limited water. By some accounts, Phase I of
the Fence now appropriates twenty-nine artesian wells (which produce 3
million cubic meters of water), as well as a number of smaller wells used
110 A recent
purely for drinking by West Bank villagers such as Izdahar.
Palestinian Water Authority report states that the first phase of the Fence
alone will probably affect more than thirty groundwater wells."' It is
estimated that the Security Fence will result in a 16.5% reduction in the
amount of the West Bank's Western aquifer to which the Palestinians will
have access. 1 2 Further, as of October 2003, construction of the Security
Fence has destroyed around 37 km of West Bank water pipes, and 80,000
olive and citrus trees, which are valuable West Bank agricultural
commodities. 13 Thus, given the reduction in Palestinian West Bank water
resources and agriculture effectuated by the Security Fence, the permanence
of the Fence will prove pivotal for meaningful water management solutions,
let alone a lasting dialogue regarding water and peace between the two
parties.

109 2 PalestiniansKilled, supra note 40 (protests against the Fence in Bidou, Beit Surik,
and Beit Iksa, villages that are just to the northwest of Jerusalem, ended with Israeli soldiers
killing two Palestinians and wounding forty-two).
110 Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ), 7.5 Implications of the Segregation
Wall in its Phase 1 on water resources. (Source: Database ARIJ, 2003) [hereinafter
Implicationsof the Segregation Wall in its Phase Ion water resources].
...PALESTINIAN WATER AUTHORITY (PWA) WATER AND SANITATION, HYGIENE (WASH)
MONITORING PROJECT (WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP) IMPACT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
TECHNICAL REPORT #7, IN COOPERATION WITH THE PALESTINIAN ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs

NETWORK (PENGON), 10 (Mar. 2003).
112 Implications of the Segregation Wall in its Phase I on water resources, supra note

110, at 61.
113 Special Report Israel's security barrier, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, at 27.
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1. The Fence and the West Bank Aquifers
The Security Fence will have a deleterious effect on Israeli-Palestinian
equitable distribution of the West Bank aquifers. The Fence enables Israel
to continue its policy of ignoring the applicable international law on
watercourses. The erection of the Security Fence also appropriates for
Israel part of the Mountain aquifer that lies east of the Green Line, leaving
valuable artesian wells in the control of Israel. Such action violates the
prevailing doctrine on the law of international watercourses: restricted
sovereignty. Instead of sharing the Mountain aquifer with the West Bank
Palestinians, whether it intended to or not, Israel appears to have launched a
policy of confiscating Mountain aquifer agricultural wells.
2. The Fence and Available Water
The Fence's impact on artesian wells in the West Bank will worsen the
humanitarian crisis in the West Bank. The loss of West Bank artesian wells
due to the Security Fence will exacerbate the current shortage of clean
water. The status of healthy water in Palestinian villages in the West Bank
during the current Intifada has been a cause for concern. B'Tselem
documented as of June 2001 that 218 West Bank towns and villages and
their approximately 197,000 residents are not part of Israel's network of
running water." 4 This number is around ten percent of the West Bank
Palestinian population." 5 Thus, these West Bank residents are forced to
utilize alternative water sources, namely springs and wells, rainfall, and
water purchased from water tankers and then stored in tanks.1 6 Many
Palestinians in the West Bank are accustomed to collecting rainfall on their
roofs, and then storing it in cisterns for summertime use. 1 7 As for
obtaining water from the West Bank's 114 springs, these springs are not
monitored for their water quality, and they are often at low levels. 118 In the
recent drought year of 1999, some of these domestic springs completely
dried up. 1 9 Thus, at times West Bank villagers are left without reliable and
healthy water.
Water tankers frequently supply water for these communities deprived
of water. However, the tanker water remains unreliable in a number of
114 B'TSELEM, NOT EVEN A DROP,

supra note 11, at 1, 4.

15 Id. at
116

4.
1d. at 5.

117 Id.; See also DIANE RAINES WARD, WATER WARS, DROUGHT, FLOOD, FOLLY, AND THE
POLITICS OF THIRST 189 (2002).
118 B'TSELEM, NOT EVEN A DROP, supra note 11, at 5.
1191Id
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Palestinians purchase much of the water from private
respects.' 20
Palestinian agricultural wells, and therefore no water quality oversight
board regulates the water. Often, market forces set the price of the tanker
Thus, residents of the
water exorbitantly higher than normal. 121
communities with no access to the water infrastructure purchase water at
high prices, and since many Palestinians have lost their source of income
since the outbreak of the al Aqsa Intifada, tanker water accounts for a
income., 2
proportionally larger share of their available
The physical separation brought about by the Fence will greatly
inconvenience those Palestinians not connected to the water network. Most
of the 274,000 Palestinians whom the Fence will directly affect will have to
travel further for their water, pay an exorbitant price, or go without water
for longer periods of time. By contrast, the Fence does not affect Israel's
water network at all. In fact, now that some of the Western aquifer lies to
the west of the Security Fence, Israel will presumably tap more of the West
Bank groundwater for Israeli uses. Such an apportionment of water
between Israel and the West Bank is far from equitable. Under such dire
circumstances, Palestinians will inevitably have less water for bathing,
washing clothes, cooking, and even drinking.
Such a lack of basic sanitation is also evident in Palestinians' restricted
access to hospitals since the increased security measures brought on by the
Fence. From September 2000, the IDF has restricted the movement of
Palestinians in the West Bank through an elaborate checkpoint system. The
delays endemic to these checkpoints cause Palestinians to seek health
services elsewhere. 23 Those Palestinians residing in "enclaves" and
"closed" areas pass through the gates within the Fence only when approved
by the IDF soldiers, who have difficulty differentiating the innocent from
terrorists. As a result, the Fence severely restricts the villagers' ability to
reach necessary health services. 24 Further, the Fence has contributed to a
120
Id.at 5-6
121 Id. at

6.

122 id.
123

Often these are pregnant women denied access to hospitals. Twenty-nine newborns

died at checkpoints between Sept. 2000 and Dec. 2002. OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
2004, CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS, UNITED NATIONS, at 18 [hereinafter OCCUPIED

PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 2004].

Id. The Fence has had the additional effect of reducing the mobility of women in the
West Bank. Since women are generally forbidden to travel unaccompanied at night, the
checkpoint system of the Fence denies direct access to neighboring villages. As a result,
Palestinian girls have begun to marry at an earlier age, so their fathers won't have to worry
about sending them off to University, where they would have to navigate the Fence's
124

checkpoints. THE IMPACT OF ISRAEL'S SEPARATION BARRIER ON AFFECTED WEST BANK
COMMUNITIES, supra, note 6, at 17; see also OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 2004, supra
note 123 at 12 ("The gender impact of the Wall").
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reduction in the amount and quality of water from tankers between 2002
and 2003.125 As a result, incidents of diarrhea in children under the age of
five have increased to 17.1%.126 It appears that the restriction of clean
water directly relates to a rise in potential disease in the West Bank.
3. The Fence's Impact on Palestinian West Bank Water and
Agriculture
The Fence will have its most harmful effect on Palestinian agriculture
and agricultural wells in the West Bank. As previously noted, the Fence
confiscates valuable Palestinian property, including farmland and
agricultural artesian wells. Such confiscation of private property directly
violates the Hague Convention, which Israel recognizes as applicable in the
West Bank.

125OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

126

Id. at 20.

2004, supra note 123, at 19.
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Table 1: The Security Fence's Impact on wells and agriculture

0

Well

O

[--"'-IFarmland

I

Palestinian
Village
Security
Fence
Green Line

a. Agricultural Wells
Prior to the Fence, Palestinian farmland in the West Bank was
exceedingly dry: according to one source, less than four percent of the
farms were irrigated.1 27 The Fence will further dry out Palestinian West
Bank farmland, by isolating and or confiscating at least thirty of the wells
used for irrigation. It just so happens that the Fence is isolating some of the
"most productive" West Bank farmland which has an abundant water
supply from agricultural wells. 128 The land that the Fence uses also

127 WARD,

supra note 117, at 189.

128 B'TSELEM, BEHIND THE BARRIER,

supra note 41, at 15.
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contains some of the West Bank's most productive wells. 129 The Fence has
hindered access to these private and communal wells, which are used
mostly for agricultural purposes. 30 Essentially, the Security Fence greatly
reduces the supply of irrigation water that is available to West Bank
Palestinians. 131 The very fact that the Fence cuts across West Bank
farmland necessitates significant damage to the preexisting water and
irrigation network in the area.' 32 Although various contractors have
attempted to restore the water network, 133 by affecting the water network
and agricultural wells the Fence has effectively eliminated a reliable
irrigation system for the nearby Palestinian farmland.
According to B'Tselem, Palestinian West Bank farmers obtain 60% of
the water they use for irrigation from springs, and the remaining 40% from
privately-owned wells.' 34 During Phase I of the Fence, Israel appropriated
at least thirty of these agricultural wells, chiefly in the areas of Qalqilya and
35
Tulkarm, where the Fence severely encroaches upon Palestinian land.
However, a close study of two United Nations maps, one of the water
sources in the West Bank and the other entitled "Enclaves and Closed Areas
between the Wall and the Green Line" reveals that probably the Fence
will
36
affect far more than thirty agricultural wells in those two districts.'
b. Agriculture
Agriculture is an important aspect of the Palestinian economy,
comprising around 7% of the GDP of the Occupied Territories, and
consuming 62% of all Palestinian water.' 37 Agriculture is particularly
important to three Western West Bank communities that are significantly
affected by the Fence: Jenin, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya. 138 These three
129

THE
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COMMUNITIES,
130
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ISRAEL'S

SEPARATION

BARRIER

ON AFFECTED

WEST BANK

BARRIER

ON AFFECTED

WEST BANK

supra note 6, at 14; see Appendix C.

IMPACT

OF

ISRAEL'S

SEPARATION

COMMUNITIES, supra note 6, at 14.
131 id.
132 id.

133 Id. at 16 (reporting that some individual contractors protect and replace water pipes
affected by_ the Fence).
134 B'TSELEM, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION, supra note 89, at 40.
135 WaSH Technical Report # 7, at 10-11 (Mar. 2003); see also OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN

2004, supra note 123, at 12 (citing "some 30 Palestinian communal water wells"
lost to the Fence).
TERRITORY

136 See Appendix B, Water Sources in the West Bank, supra note 21; See UN Map,

Enclaves and Closed Areas between the Wall and the Green Line, supra note 21.
137 B'TSELEM, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION, supra note 89, at 40.

138 B'TSELEM, BEHIND THE BARRIER, supra note 41, at 15-16.
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districts boast the highest percentage of land used for farming in all of the
West Bank, "with 59% in Tulkarm, 50% in Jenin, and 46% in Qalqilya,"
measured against an average of 24.5% of a district's land used for
farming. 139 Together they comprise 37% of West Bank farmland, 140 and in
the year 2000 they accounted for "$220 million in agricultural output," or
45.1% of the West Bank's total agricultural output.1 4 1 The farmland in
these three districts accounts for 43% of the agricultural jobs in the West
Bank, though the total population of the three districts adds up to only 25%
of the West Bank population. 142
As vital as the farmland of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya is to the West
Bank agricultural economy, the Security Fence will separate many of the
Palestinian farmers in these districts from their farmland. The West Bank
communities will lie on the eastern side of the Fence, while their fertile
farmland will lie on the western side of the Fence. 143 The total number of
West Bank residents separated from their fields is not small: 6,000 Jenin
District residents, 37,600 Tulkarm District residents, and 11,600 Qalqilya
District residents, as well as 16,800 Jerusalem District residents.' 4 The
completed Stage I of the Fence will contain some twenty-six agricultural
gates, through which West Bank farmers with "special permits" can access
their fields to the west of the Fence. 145 Despite the provision of agricultural
gates, the Fence will render Palestinian farmers "dependent on Israel's
security system when they want to cross the barrier from either side.' 46
Since the Security Fence physically separates the West Bank farmers from
their fields, and since the IDF controls which Palestinians to allow from the
east to the west of the Fence, there are insufficient regulations in place to
prevent adverse effects on the West Bank agricultural economy.
Though the agricultural gates provide access to the farms to the west
of the Fence, the very presence of the Fence will reduce agricultural profits
for the West Bank farmers. The Fence will likely slow the supply of farm
machines, seeds, and fertilizer to the farms west of the Fence, 17 since the
IDF will not grant other West Bank Palestinians easy access to these
farmlands. 148 The cost of transporting materials to the farmlands will rise
"9/d.at 16.
140 THE

IMPACT
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ISRAEL'S

SEPARATION

BARRIER

COMMUNIrIES, supra note 6, at 22.
141Id.

142B'TSELEM, BEHIND THE BARRIER supra note 41, at 16.
143 Id.at 10.
144id.
45

1 ,Id.at 7, 12.

'461d.at 13.
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due to the Fence, while the farmers' cost of transporting the crops back to
the West Bank to sell them will also rise. 14 9 In short, the Fence will cripple
the farming economy of the Palestinian West Bank.
B. Political Justification For Israel's Security Fence
Despite the stultifying impact the Fence will have on West Bank water
rights and Palestinian agriculture, and on the peace process itself, the
Security Fence is ostensibly the Israeli Government's reaction to some very
legitimate concerns. After enduring scores of deadly suicide bombings
during this now four year al Aqsa Intifida, the Israelis are faced with serious
safety issues. Stuck in the midst of a "catch-22" situation, if they take all
aspects of security into their own hands, they will likely incur the continued
wrath of the Palestinian militant suicide bombers, yet if they tear down the
Security Fence and defer the responsibility of containing the suicide
bombers to the Palestinian Authority, they abdicate their security. It is a
fact that Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority did not successfully
rein in militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad; the newly elected
president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, has yet to prove
that he can tame these now formidable organizations.
Given the political realities of Palestinian armed attacks upon Israeli
soldiers and civilians, Israel has the right to self-defense under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter. 150 Self-defense in the instant case entails mitigating and
ideally eliminating carnage from suicide attacks. An essential question is
whether the Fence is a proportionate means of attaining security. 15' This
Note argues that when one considers the negative impact the Fence will
have on Palestinian West Bank water rights and agricultural economy, it is
evident that Israel should employ different means by which to achieve
security, or at least move the Fence to shadow the Green Line. The Fence's
intrusion upon Palestinian water and agricultural rights does not render the
Palestinians a more willing partner for peace. In no way does this Note
advocate the employment of suicide attack strategy against Israel.
14 9 Id. at 15.
0 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right

of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security").
151 For more information on determining whether a nation has legally used self-defense,
see THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATrACKS (2002). Franck states that Israel's preemptive attack on the armed forces of
neighboring Arab states in 1967 was generally considered legal self-defense because a threat
was imminent, and the response was proportionate. Id. Israel's 1981 air strike on an Iraqi
nuclear plant, however, was generally considered an illegal use of preemptive self-defense,
because the threat was not imminent, and the response was not proportionate. Id
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However, before the Fence was built, Israel had a better chance of reaching
an agreement with the Palestinians than they do now that it encircles a
smaller and more arid West Bank.
C. Squandering A Vital Opportunity For Peace
The Fence exacerbates an already dire water situation in the West
Bank. Water is a vital issue for the final peace negotiations, and with the
Fence, Israel makes a mistake by burdening the Palestinians even more.
The Israeli Government cannot expect that its policy of keeping
Palestinians from their water and agricultural lands via a virtually
impassable Fence will do anything to benefit the peace process. 152 In the
face of such hardships, the Palestinians cannot approach negotiations on an
equal footing with Israel. An equitable distribution of water, or an
improved water pricing system, would further the peace negotiations. Israel
should not wait until the final peace solution. It should desist from building
the Fence or move it closer to the Green Line, and rectify the water
situation.
IV. Political Solutions To The Security Fence And The West Bank Water
Crisis
Since the Security Fence appropriates Palestinian West Bank wells and
farmland, thereby harming Israel's reputation in the world community,
Israel should pursue political solutions to the Fence and the water problem.
These solutions could include a water market approach, a system of free
access to water, and a trusteeship for the West Bank and its water, as well
as the current mainstream political proposals such as the Road Map and the
Geneva Accord.
Israel is in the midst of several joint-water projects with Jordan and the
Palestinian Authority, and its official stance is that once the peace process
is well under way, it will implement further joint projects with the
Palestinian Authority.153 However, the water issue will factor preeminently
in any final peace negotiations. As the Middle East water expert Sharif
152 Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court heard the grievances of Palestinians affected by the

Fence in the area near Jerusalem and recently ruled that although building the Security Fence
complies with international law, and despite the fact that the Government's motives were
based on security and not politics, the Government must move the Fence near Jerusalem so
as to reduce the burden on Palestinians. H.C.J. 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v.
Israel (June 30, 2004); see also Jewish Virtual Library, Fact Sheets #24: Israel's Security
Fence (UpdatedJuly 14, 2004), at 3.

" Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations: Regional Cooperation on
Water Issues, available at http://www.israel-un.org/intlcoop/water.htm.
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Elmusa noted in an interview with Diane Raines Ward, "the stronger
riparians will compromise only to the extent they wish. But you will not
have a peace agreement without a water agreement. This is where
International Law is important. ' 15 4 Thus, an equitable and legal water
solution in the West Bank is inextricably linked to the success of the peace
process.
A. Comparative Solutions
Examining international responses to water crises brings to light
possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. For example, South
Africa and Australia, both arid countries like Israel and Palestine, boast
some of the world's most successful water policies.
1. Australian Market Approach
Australia has recently evenly distributed its water resources by
emphasizing water pricing and trading in the marketplace. 155 The different
Australian states engage in water trading with one another, and the supply
and demand of the water market thus ensures that all areas of the country
have an adequate water supply.15 6 If, someday, the Palestinians have their
own sovereign State, then the Australian water market model could prove
helpful to the Palestinian Government. Assuming that statehood will grant
the Palestinians sovereignty over natural resources, the Palestinian State
would control the Mountain Aquifer, which provides most of the water to
the Northern West Bank, and much of the water Israel uses. Israel would
then have to strike some water allocation deal with the new State, or suffer
the economic burden of using a more extensive method of bringing water to
Israel.' 57 Perhaps a Palestinian State could trade water from the West
Bank's Mountain aquifer to Israel.158 The water trading system would
boost the Palestinian economy, and to some extent would even the balance
of power between the two countries. However, such an Israeli-Palestinian
water market would possibly prove dangerous to the Palestinians. Due to
the current vast differences in wealth between Israel and the Palestinians,
154WARD,

supra note 117, at 191.

155A Survey of Water, THE ECONoMIST, (July 17, 2003) at 13.
156

Id.

157Such as overland water pipe systems, and desalination.
158For more information on water markets and pricing systems see Robert E. Kohn,

Israel'sNeed to Import Freshwater,WATER, AIR, AND SOIL POLLUTION 143, 257-270 (2003);
Alan Richards & Nirvikar Singh, No Easy Exit: PropertyRights, Markets, and Negotiations
over Water, UCSC Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 463 (Sept. 2000)
(discussing the complexities of an Israeli-Palestinian water market).
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the Palestinians would run the risk of not being able to compete on equal
footing in the water market.
2. South African Free Access
South Africa's water situation is similar to the Middle East water
landscape. Under apartheid, the white minority dominated the country's
water resources, at the expense of the black minority. The apartheid regime
used the allocation of water in rural areas as a political weapon. 159 In the
West Bank, the Israeli Government has the upper hand over the Palestinians
in terms of military and political might. Israel has used that regional
preeminence to siphon off increasing amounts of water from the Jordan
River, thereby leveraging that control of the water resources to win more
concessions from the Palestinians at the peace table.160 One way that the
South African Government healed the wounds from water disputes of the
apartheid regime era, was to make the water system much more affordable
for the rural poor. The government has implemented a program where the
first twenty-five litres of water per day per person are completely free.161 If
the Israeli Government implemented such a generous solution in the West
Bank, and supplied daily a certain amount of free water to Palestinian
villages and homes connected to the water system, then the Palestinian
evaluation of Israel's intentions as to the water supply would undoubtedly
turn more favorable.
B. A Trusteeship for West Bank Water
One possible solution to the West Bank water problem is to place
control of the aquifers in the hands of a disinterested, third party
trusteeship. The trustee would then ensure the equitable allocation of water
between the Israelis and the West Bank Palestinians. One theory suggests
that the United Nations Environment Program ("UNEP") should act as a
trusteeship committee and manage the Jordan River Basin. 162 Here, UNEP
would manage the water of the Jordan River Basin under the public trust
doctrine, which provides that the trustee holds the property and natural
resources in question subject to a public trust for the benefit of the citizens;
1 63
the trustee is legally bound to protect the property and natural resources.
159 A Survey of Water, THE ECONOMIST, (July 17, 2003) at 13.
160 id
161 id. at

13-14.

162 Melanne Andromecca Civic, A New Conceptual Framework ForJordan River Basin

Management: A Proposal For A Trusteeship Commission, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 285, 286, 324 (Summer 1998).
163 Id. at 314.
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However, this particular trusteeship model may work for the greater Jordan
River Basin, but it might not work for the specific West Bank water issues.
The trusteeship would probably have to be voluntary, 64 and it is not likely
that both Israel and the Palestinians would renounce their autonomy on the
West Bank and place the administration of such a vital resource as water in
the hands of a third party. Under Article 77 of the U.N. Charter, a United
Nations international trusteeship system would apply if the territories of the
trusteeship were "voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible
for their administration.' 65 Israel in particular would probably not
acquiesce to placing the West Bank territories under the supervision of the
United Nations.
Another Palestine trusteeship theory proposes a United States-led
trusteeship that holds the Palestinian territories in trust for the Palestinians
166
The U.N.
until the birth of a self-sustaining Palestinian democracy.
Security Council would support the trusteeship with a resolution. 67 The
trusteeship would run into security problems, however. The IDF, Hamas,
and Islamic Jihad would likely chafe under the reins of a United States
security force.' 68 Yet, a trusteeship for the West Bank addressing the
problem of equitable water use would provide a relatively smooth transition
from the al Aqsa Intifada to a two State solution.
C. Prospects For A Political Solution In The West Bank
At the time of this writing, hope for a viable political and economic
situation in the West Bank is bleak. Israel's Security Fence necessitates
that grim prognosis. In its attempt to prevent suicide attacks, Israel has
reduced its chances of gaining security assurances from the Palestinian
Authority. Palestinians see the Security Fence as a land grab, an egregious
affront to their sovereignty and basic human rights. If the Palestinians
secure an agreement with Israel concerning the West Bank, they will insist
on the moving or dismantling of the Security Fence. Until that time,
Palestinians only see the Fence as a highly visible and humiliating emblem
of Israeli occupation.

Id. at 328.
'64
165 U.N. CHARTER

art. 77, para. 1(c).

166 Martin Indyk, A Trusteeshipfor Palestine?, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 2003, at 54-

5.
167Id.

at 55-6.

168
Id.at 59.
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1. The Road Map
Since the "Quartet" of the United States, the European Union, Russia,
and the United Nations announced the "Road Map" for peace on June 24,
2002, both the Israelis and Palestinians have failed to meet the deadlines 1set
69
in the document. Israel's reluctance to dismantle West Bank settlements
and the failure of the Palestinian Authority to rein in the militant groups has
effectively derailed the Road Map. Prime Minister Sharon of Israel has
recently warned that unless the Road Map peace process produces
significant results, Israel will disengage from the West Bank and the Road
170
Map, and withdraw to the new political and security border of the Fence.
If somehow the parties implement the Road Map, they would presumably
resolve the West Bank water issue by 2005 and Phase III: Permanent Status
Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 171 It appears,
though, that the Permanent Status Agreement and a solution to the water
issue remain in the distant future.
2. The Geneva Accord
The unofficial agreement between former Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators, known as the Geneva Accord, is more promising than the Road
Map. If Israeli and Palestinian public opinion back this plan, seeing it as a
way out of the current static and desperate situation, then perhaps the
official negotiators will take notice and reach an accord. In that case, the
agreement should attempt to resolve the water crisis in the West Bank.
Israel should find an alternative security solution and at least move the
Security Fence closer to the Green Line.
V. Conclusion
A solution to the worsening water crisis between the Israelis and
Palestinians would be a catalyst for the floundering peace process. The
Israeli Government should realize that the Fence's harmful effect on West
Bank agriculture and water rights is reducing the likelihood of legitimate
169

Mr. Sharon's government has started to dismantle a few settlement outposts, though

monitoring organizations claim that more than fifty of these outposts now exist. Greg Myre,
Sharon Hints Israel Might Alter Route of West Bank Barrier,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004 at
A8.
170 Craig S. Smith, Egyptian Urges Arafat to Subdue Factions, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 2, 2004 at
A4.
171A

Performance-BasedRoad Map To A PermanentTwo-State Solution To The IsraeliPalestinian Conflict, at http://www.un.org/media/main/roadmap122002.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2003).
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peace negotiations. Israel should now fully explore political solutions
which would eliminate or significantly alter the route of the Fence.
Given the length and severity of the al Aqsa Intifada, the water issue is
increasing in political importance. As the Fence appropriates especially
fertile Palestinian West Bank land, and as West Bank villagers suffer from
an extreme lack of clean water, Palestinian rancor towards Israel grows
incrementally. Such hatred renders Palestinian public opinion less likely to
support a peaceable two-state solution. By pursuing policies such as the
Security Fence, Israel may fulfill its own prophecy that the Palestinians will
not stop at statehood, but will continue fighting Israel until Israel ceases to
exist. In order to avoid such extremes, the Israeli Government should
consider how to reinvent itself in the eyes of Palestinians. If Israel makes
some concessions to the Palestinians in addition to pulling out of Gaza,
such as on water in the West Bank, perhaps it will secure political capital
for itself, which it can then expend during negotiations to better ensure a
lasting and relatively peaceful two-state solution.
To preserve the hope for peace, Israel should utilize an alternative way
to achieve security from suicide bomb attacks. One obvious alternative is
building the Fence on or almost on the Green Line. That Fence would not
prompt Palestinians to accuse Israel of a land grab, and it would not disrupt
the irrigation of valuable West Bank farmland. As the Fence stands now,
however, it is in violation of The Hague Convention and the law of
Occupied Territories, since it encroaches upon West Bank land,
appropriating agricultural wells and farmland. If the Fence becomes the de
facto border between Israel and the West Bank, that border will violate the
Hague Convention. Even if the Fence is dismantled someday, the question
of borders in the West Bank will remain pressing, so the two parties should
start to seek a resolution of the borders issue that fairly solves West Bank
water issues. Other political options include market-based and free access
approaches to water, a trusteeship for the West Bank and its water, the
Geneva Accords, and the disintegrating Road Map. All of these options
would allocate West Bank water more equitably than does the Security
Fence solution.
Indeed, Israel should abandon the current route of the Security Fence
and desist from ruining West Bank agricultural wells and farmlands.
Instead of placing the Fence where only security demands it, Israel should
pay heed to the wider problem of West Bank water. If the Palestinians get
their State, control of the West Bank aquifers will rest entirely with the
Palestinian Government. Israel will then lose access to the West Bank
aquifers, and have a serious water crisis on its hands. Therefore, Israel
should rectify the West Bank water problem now.
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Appendix B: Water Sources in the West Bank
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